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Abstracts - Frank Alcock
Introduction
While conservation and efficiency issues have dominated contemporary discussions of fisheries management, the real world of fisheries management is been plagued by problems of distribution. At all societal levels, the international, the national and the local, issues of distribution are critical to the performance of resource management regimes. Our paper explores options for how issues of distribution are being dealt with under the Law of the Sea Treaty and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
Methods and Materials
This paper will include theoretical and empirical sections. The theoretical section draws from a book manuscript being developed by one of the authors while the empirical section draws on a number of primary documents and author observations from international conventions and associated negotiations on the Law of the Sea Treaty and UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
Result
We argue that the introduction of new regulations in a fishery will always entail distributive implications. Changing the way a “pie of resources” is be managed affects the way that pie will be sliced. We illustrate this by discussing a number of governance principles and policy options in both a theoretical and empirical context.
Conclusions
We explain past debates and future options for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
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Introduction
An important dimension of equity in fisheries management concerns the distribution of rents from the fishery among harvesters and downstream segments of the industry. This dimension is heavily influenced by the degree of vertical integration in a given fishery. Property rights preferences in fisheries are often shaped by expectations regarding the impact such rights will have upon vertical integration.
Methods and Materials
The methods employed in this paper are comparative in nature. The paper will draw upon material from a book manuscript being prepared by the author. The manuscript examines the presence and scope of IFQ programs in Iceland, Norway, Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.
Results
The presence of vertical integration is an instructive indicator for a given fishery’s preferences regarding IFQs. IFQs are typically embraced in fisheries that have a high degree of vertical integration prior to the introduction of IFQs. Fisheries with little or no vertical integration are typically resistant to IFQs. Where IFQs are adopted in fisheries with little or no vertical integration they are usually designed in a manner that restricts it.
Conclusions
Vertical integration is at the center of equity concerns that underpin resistance to IFQs. However, IFQs can be designed in a manner that ameliorates these concerns. Sacrificing a degree of efficiency in the name of greater equity will allow for quicker adoption of property rights reforms. Download Paper
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